

Cybersecurity for IoT – Private Key Cryptography

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
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Pavia 2018

Feistel Cipher Structure

- Horst Feistel devised the **feistel cipher**
 - based on concept of invertible product cipher
- partitions input block into two halves
 - process through multiple rounds which
 - perform a substitution on left data half
 - based on round function of right half & subkey
 - then have permutation swapping halves
- implements Shannon's S-P net concept

Feistel Cipher Structure



Feistel Cipher Design Elements

- block size
- key size
- number of rounds
- subkey generation algorithm
- round function
- fast software en/decryption
- ease of analysis

Data Encryption Standard (DES)

- most widely used block cipher in world
- adopted in 1977 by NBS (now NIST)
 - as FIPS PUB 46
- encrypts 64-bit data using 56-bit key
- has widespread use
- has been considerable controversy over its security

DES History

- IBM developed Lucifer cipher
 - by team led by Feistel in late 60's
 - used 64-bit data blocks with 128-bit key
- then redeveloped as a commercial cipher with input from NSA and others
- in 1973 NBS issued request for proposals for a national cipher standard
- IBM submitted their revised Lucifer which was eventually accepted as the DES

DES Design Controversy

- although DES standard is public
- was considerable controversy over design
 - in choice of 56-bit key (vs Lucifer 128-bit)
 - and because design criteria were classified
- subsequent events and public analysis show in fact design was appropriate
- use of DES has flourished
 - especially in financial applications
 - still standardised for legacy application use

Multiple Encryption & DES

- clear a replacement for DES was needed
 - theoretical attacks that can break it
 - demonstrated exhaustive key search attacks
- AES is a new cipher alternative
- prior to this alternative was to use multiple encryption with DES implementations
- Triple-DES is the chosen form

Double-DES?

- could use 2 DES encrypts on each block
 - $C = E_{K_2}(E_{K_1}(P))$
- issue of reduction to single stage
- and have “meet-in-the-middle” attack
 - works whenever use a cipher twice
 - since $X = E_{K_1}(P) = D_{K_2}(C)$
 - attack by encrypting P with all keys and store
 - then decrypt C with keys and match X value
 - can show takes $O(2^{56})$ steps

Triple-DES with Two-Keys

- hence must use 3 encryptions
 - would seem to need 3 distinct keys
- but can use 2 keys with E-D-E sequence
 - $C = E_{K1}(D_{K2}(E_{K1}(P)))$
 - nb encrypt & decrypt equivalent in security
 - if $K1=K2$ then can work with single DES
- standardized in ANSI X9.17 & ISO8732
- no current known practical attacks
 - several proposed impractical attacks might become basis of future attacks

Triple-DES with Three-Keys

- although there are no practical attacks on two-key Triple-DES, there are some indications
- can use Triple-DES with Three-Keys to avoid even these
 - $C = E_{K_3}(D_{K_2}(E_{K_1}(P)))$
- has been adopted by some Internet applications, eg PGP, S/MIME


Origins

- clear a replacement for DES was needed
 - have theoretical attacks that can break it
 - have demonstrated exhaustive key search attacks
- can use Triple-DES – but slow, has small blocks
- US NIST issued call for ciphers in 1997
- 15 candidates accepted in Jun 98
- 5 were shortlisted in Aug-99
- Rijndael was selected as the AES in Oct-2000
- issued as FIPS PUB 197 standard in Nov-2001

The AES Cipher - Rijndael

- designed by Rijmen-Daemen in Belgium
- has 128/192/256 bit keys, 128 bit data
- an **iterative** rather than **feistel** cipher
 - processes data as block of 4 columns of 4 bytes
 - operates on entire data block in every round
- designed to be:
 - resistant against known attacks
 - speed and code compactness on many CPUs
 - design simplicity


AES Encryption Process




AES Structure

- data block of 4 columns of 4 bytes is state
- key is expanded to array of words
- has 9/11/13 rounds in which state undergoes:
 - byte substitution (1 S-box used on every byte)
 - shift rows (permute bytes between groups/columns)
 - mix columns (subs using matrix multiply of groups)
 - add round key (XOR state with key material)
 - view as alternating XOR key & scramble data bytes
- initial XOR key material & incomplete last round
- with fast XOR & table lookup implementation

AES Structure



AES Round




Random Numbers

- many uses of **random numbers** in cryptography
 - nonces in authentication protocols to prevent replay
 - session keys
 - public key generation
 - keystream for a one-time pad
- in all cases its critical that these values be
 - statistically random, uniform distribution, independent
 - unpredictability of future values from previous values
- true random numbers provide this
- care needed with generated random numbers


Pseudorandom Number Generators (PRNGs)

- often use deterministic algorithmic techniques to create “random numbers”
 - although are not truly random
 - can pass many tests of “randomness”
- known as “pseudorandom numbers”
- created by “Pseudorandom Number Generators (PRNGs)”

Random & Pseudorandom Number Generators



Stream Cipher Structure



Stream Cipher Properties

- some design considerations are:
 - long period with no repetitions
 - statistically random
 - depends on large enough key
 - large linear complexity
- properly designed, can be as secure as a block cipher with same size key
- but usually simpler & faster

RC4

- a proprietary cipher owned by RSA DSI
- another Ron Rivest design, simple but effective
- variable key size, byte-oriented stream cipher
- widely used (web SSL/TLS, wireless WEP/WPA)
- key forms random permutation of all 8-bit values
- uses that permutation to scramble input info processed a byte at a time

RC4 Key Schedule

- starts with an array S of numbers: 0..255
- use key to well and truly shuffle
- S forms **internal state** of the cipher

```
for i = 0 to 255 do
    S[i] = i
    T[i] = K[i mod keylen])
j = 0
for i = 0 to 255 do
    j = (j + S[i] + T[i]) (mod 256)
    swap (S[i], S[j])
```


RC4 Encryption

- encryption continues shuffling array values
- sum of shuffled pair selects "stream key" value from permutation
- XOR $S[t]$ with next byte of message to en/decrypt

$i = j = 0$

for each message byte M_i

$i = (i + 1) \pmod{256}$


$j = (j + S[i]) \pmod{256}$

swap($S[i]$, $S[j]$)


$t = (S[i] + S[j]) \pmod{256}$

$C_i = M_i \text{ XOR } S[t]$


RC4 Overview



(a) Initial state of S and T



(b) Initial permutation of S



(c) Stream Generation

RC4 Security

- claimed secure against known attacks
 - have some analyses, none practical
- result is very non-linear
- since RC4 is a stream cipher, must **never reuse a key**
- have a concern with WEP, but due to key handling rather than RC4 itself

Questions??